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Abstract
Adversarial examples are data points misclas-
sified by neural networks. Originally, adver-
sarial examples were limited to adding small
perturbations to a given image. Recent work
introduced the generalized concept of unre-
stricted adversarial examples, without limits
on the added perturbations. In this paper, we
introduce a new category of attacks that cre-
ate unrestricted adversarial examples for ob-
ject detection. Our key idea is to generate
adversarial objects that are unrelated to the
classes identified by the target object detec-
tor. Different from previous attacks, we use
off-the-shelf Generative Adversarial Networks
(GAN), without requiring any further train-
ing or modification. Our method consists of
searching over the latent normal space of the
GAN for adversarial objects that are wrongly
identified by the target object detector. We
evaluate this method on the commonly used
Faster R-CNN ResNet-101, Inception v2 and
SSD Mobilenet v1 object detectors using logo
generative iWGAN-LC and SNGAN trained
on CIFAR-10. The empirical results show
that the generated adversarial objects are in-
distinguishable from non-adversarial objects
generated by the GANs, transferable between
the object detectors and robust in the physical
world. This is the first work to study unre-
stricted false positive adversarial examples for
object detection.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) are increasingly used in
safety critical applications. One important use case is us-
ing machine learning for traffic sign detection. With the
popularity of DNN models used in critical applications,
the threat of creating malicious imagery also increases.
These attacks are called adversarial examples. The role
of an adversarial example is to fool the DNN in classify-
ing the input image differently from how a human would.
Neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable
to adversarial examples in [Szegedy et al., 2013].
Follow up work [Carlini and Wagner, 2017,
Goodfellow et al., 2015, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016,
Su et al., 2019] improved the algorithms to generate
adversarial examples based on small perturbations
of the input. [Song et al., 2018, Wang et al., 2019]
use generative adversarial networks (GAN) to create
unrestricted adversarial examples, instead of perturbing
existing images. While many techniques focus on digital
attacks, where the attacker has access to either the
camera or the IT infrastructure, it is important to explore
and understand feasible physical attacks in more detail.
In this work, we introduce a new attack that synthe-
sizes unrestricted adversarial examples for object detec-
tion. We believe this is the first work that investigates
unrestricted adversarial examples that cause false posi-
tives for object detection. Our method generates, using
off-the-shelf GANs, adversarial objects that are wrongly
identified by object detectors. We evaluate our attack in
a physical world setting and observe that the adversarial
objects are robust to the positioning of the camera.
Figure 1 shows an overview of the new attack, instanti-
ated for traffic sign detectors and using a GAN that gen-
erates logos. Since logos are frequently found on cars,
buildings, shops, billboards, a malicious logo that attacks
a traffic sign DNN detector has small changes of raising
suspicion. Our algorithm optimizes latent variables, such
that the GAN synthesizes logos that look natural and are
adversarial to the target traffic sign detector. In this ex-
ample, the logo is detected as a danger sign by the traffic
sign DNN detector.
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Figure 1: Overview of our method for creating adversarial objects using off-the-shelf GAN.
Our Contributions The main contributions of this
work are:
1. We introduce a new attack category, namely unre-
stricted false positive adversarial objects, that are
unrestricted adversarial examples for object detec-
tion which resemble other natural objects in physi-
cal world.
2. The paper describes a novel and effective algorithm
for generating adversarial objects for object detec-
tion neural networks, using pre-trained GANs.
3. We implement our algorithm and evaluate it us-
ing widely used Faster R-CNN Object Detection
networks based on ResNet-101 and Inception v2
and the SSD Mobilenet, trained for traffic sign de-
tection. To generate the adversarial objects, we
evaluate two generative models: logo generating
iWGAN-LC and the SNGAN trained on CIFAR-10.
4. We demonstrate the transferability of the synthe-
sized adversarial examples between different object
detection networks and the robustness of the attacks
in a physical setup.
In the next section, we provide background information
on adversarial examples. Next, in section 3 we explain
the theory behind our attack and we present the results of
our empirical evaluation in section 4. Before concluding,
we present related work in section 5.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Let I be the set of all digital images and O ⊆ I a subset
of natural images from a specific domain (e.g., handwrit-
ten numbers). Oracle o : I −→ {1, 2, ...K, ν, φ} maps
images in its domainO toK classes, all other natural im-
ages to a class ν, and unnatural (noisy) images to class
φ. The oracle o represents a human observer. The clas-
sifier f : I −→ {1, 2, ...K} maps all digital images to
one of K classes. As defined in [Song et al., 2018], a
perturbation-based adversarial example x is an image x
obtained by perturbing an original image x′ such that the
classifier f maps the original and the perturbed images to
different classes. The perturbation must be small enough
to fool the classifier but not the oracle.
Definition 1 (Perturbation-Based Adversarial Exam-
ples). Perturbation-based adversarial examples Ap are
defined for a (test) subset of images T ⊆ O, and a small
perturbation bound  as:
Ap , {x ∈ O | ∃x′ ∈ T : ||x − x′|| ≤  ∧ f(x) 6=
f(x′) = o(x) = o(x′)}
To generate a perturbation-based adversarial example for
an object classifier, one must solve an optimisation prob-
lem. [Yuan et al., 2019] defines a general optimisation
problem:
minx′ ||x′ − x||
s.t.f(x′) 6= f(x)
x ∈ [0, 1]
where || · || measures the distance between the adversar-
ial example and the original image. Large perturbations
might fool both the human and the classifier, making the
attack fail the task, or make the adversarial example be
outside of intended domain O.
The distance function between the original image and the
adversarial example measures how close the images are
to each other. An ideal distance function would model
human perception, rather than the pixel-based distance.
[Rozsa et al., 2016] tried to create a more complex func-
tion to capture human vision through luminance, con-
trast, and structural measures. [Jang et al., 2017] based
the similarity function on Fourier transformations around
the edges. In practice, most research work uses the lp
distance as a proxy.
The optimization of the general problem is hard due
to the high non-linearity of the distance functions
[Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. For a summary on different
approaches to reformulating the problem, we refer the
reader to [Yuan et al., 2019].
[Carlini and Wagner, 2017] solved the optimisation
problem for perturbations η on top of original image x′:
minη ||η| |p + κg(x′ + η, x′) (1)
s.t.x′ + η ∈ [0, 1]n (2)
in an iterative manner, using gradient descent. The func-
tion g evaluates classification error of the target classifier.
Value of g for an original and an adversarial image is low
they are classified to different classes, and high if they are
classified as the same class. The lp norm ||η||p regular-
izes the amount of perturbation applied. κ is a unitless
trade-off parameter for regularization. Finally, the con-
straint enforces the image with perturbation is still a valid
picture with pixel values in the range of [0, 1].
2.2 GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORK
A Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) is a network
consisting of a discriminator and a generator. The dis-
criminator’s goal is to distinguish generated images from
real ones. The generator takes as an input a latent vari-
able z ∼ N (0, 1) and outputs an image. Its goal is to
fool the discriminator to not recognize that the image is
artificial. This goal is expressed as a loss function during
the training phase of the GAN. GANs can be conditioned
to generate images in a specific class c: GAN(z, c).
2.3 UNRESTRICTED ADVERSARIAL
EXAMPLES
[Song et al., 2018] explores the idea of creating adver-
sarial images that are not constrained by a distance func-
tion. The restrictions for adversarial images are lifted,
and they only require the classification to be different
from the oracle label.
Definition 2 (Unrestricted Adversarial Examples).
[Song et al., 2018] defines unrestricted adversarial ex-
amples as Au , {x ∈ O | f(x) 6= o(x)}
They train a GAN network that approximates the do-
main O of images. The GAN is further conditioned on
the class c of images to generate. Assuming that a per-
fect GAN network generates natural images of class c
if z is sampled from the GAN’s latent distribution Q:
∀z ∼ Q, c : GAN(z, c) ∈ O ∧ o(GAN(z, c)) = c, they
find latent variables z such that f(GAN(z, c)) 6= c. The
optimization problem is then simplified as:
minz g′(GAN(z, c), c)
for a new classification error function g′. g′ evaluates to a
low value for a latent variable z and a target class c, if an
imageGAN(z, c) is not classified as c. It is evaluated to a
greater value if it is classified as c. They overcome issues
of using distance functions to measure perturbations by
using GAN generated images.
2.4 WHITE-BOX VS BLACK-BOX ATTACK
[Yuan et al., 2019] classifies the attacks in two categories
depending on the attacker model. A white-box attacker
has full access to the attacked DNN, can view individual
trained parameters and perform operations with it. On
the other hand, a black-box attack limits the access to the
target DNN. The attacker is only allowed to feed images
into the target network and observe outputs and cannot
directly observe the inner working of the model.
2.5 ADVERSARIAL OBJECTS
When a physical world scenario is considered, the at-
tacker can not perturb the entire scene. Most of
the physical world attacks are conducted using ad-
versarial stickers. An adversarial sticker is a print-
able 2D shape with a filling that is chosen by
the attacker [Sharif et al., 2016, Eykholt et al., 2018b,
Eykholt et al., 2018a, Chen et al., 2018].
In computer vision, we discriminate the models between
classifiers and object detectors. A classifier outputs the
class of an image, whereas detectors label objects in the
digital image. [Lu et al., 2017] showed that attacking an
object detector is more difficult than attacking an object
classifier. The object detector finds an object in the image
whereas the object classifier only outputs the class of the
image. An adversarial object is an adversarial example
attacking the object detector.
Successful adversarial examples are either classified as
false positives (FP) or false negatives (FN). A false nega-
tive attack occurs when a perturbed input is classified dif-
ferently from the input without perturbation, e.g. ignored
or incorrectly classified. A false positive is when a input
which would not be classified at all is assigned a class.
A FP attack makes object detectors detect at least one
object of the target class, even though it is not present.
2.6 OBJECT DETECTORS
Faster R-CNN [Ren et al., 2015] is a neural network ar-
chitecture for object detection. It first generates generic
object bounding box proposals, which it then classifies
in the second step. The network is optimized for speed,
by using only a single CNN for both stages.
The Single Shot Detector [Liu et al., 2016] uses one
propagation through the network to detect all objects and
assign them classes. It detects a high number of bound-
ing boxes in different sizes, and then picks one bounding
box for each object.
3 DESIGN
We present our novel attack that generates unrestricted
false positive adversarial objects for object detection.
3.1 UNRESTRICTED FALSE POSITIVE
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
The oracle o not only labels objects in domain O to K
classes, as defined in section 2, it also differentiates be-
tween all other natural images ν and noisy, unnatural dig-
ital images φ. A detector d works similarly to the classi-
fier f , however it has an extra class ⊥ for all undetected
images. These correspond to images that the detector
does not identify as being one of the K target classes,
but as other natural or noisy images (classes ν and φ of
the observer).
Definition 3 (Unrestricted False Positive Adversarial Ex-
amples). Unrestricted FP adversarial examples are de-
fined as Afp , {x ∈ I \ O | o(x) = ν ∧ d(x) ∈
{1, 2, ...K}}.
Afp is a set of natural images (such that they can occur
in physical world) that a detector identifies as one of the
K classes, but to a human observer they look like one
of many objects in physical world, not part of one of the
K categories. Finally, we define the set M = {x ∈
I \ O | o(x) = ν} containing all the natural images
outside the K target classes.
3.2 ATTACKER MODEL
The attacker model that we consider assumes that he can
only augment the physical world. However, to generate
the proposed adversarial object, the attacker requires full
access to the object detection network (white-box). Our
empirical evaluation in section 4 shows the transferabil-
ity of adversarial objects between different object detec-
tion models trained on the same dataset. This allows the
attacker to perform an attack without having access to
the exact target object detector (black-box).
3.3 EFFECTIVE GENERATION OF
UNRESTRICTED FALSE POSITIVE
ADVERSARIAL OBJECTS
To generate an object inM, we choose an arbitrary un-
conditional GAN such that ∀z : GAN(z) ∈ M ∧ ∃z :
d(GAN(z)) = {1, 2, ...K}. Such a GAN defines a sub-
set ofM. The attacker can select which domain to use
by using different GANs.
We optimize for the latent vector z in a loss function L
which is composed of two terms:
L = L0 + κL1 (3)
L0 is a term enforcing an adversarial output, L1 is en-
forcing the natural look of the GAN output and κ is a
unitless trade-off parameter for regularization.
To perform a targeted attack for a specific class c within
O we can use the loss term:
L′0 = − log Pr[d(GAN(z)) = c]
L′0 is forcing the optimizer to find a latent vector z, such
that the GAN generates an image which is classified with
the target class label c.
An object detection DNN performs both object proposal
generation and detection. It takes as input a digital image
x′ and creates n object proposals that the object detec-
tion DNN should identify. Proposals B1, B2, ...Bn cor-
respond to cropped images of objects in the original im-
age. Bk(x′) is the kth object in x′. Since we do not know
which proposal will correspond to our adversarial object,
L′0 must be reformulated as:
L0 = −
n∑
i=1
log Pr[d(Bi(GAN(z)⊕ x′)) = c] (4)
To generate a physical adversarial object, we first need
to simulate it in a digital image and then print it. The
⊕ operation signifies the overlap of the generated object
over a small space of original image.
A positive outcome of the new loss function is that the
object detection DNN can detect multiple objects in the
same adversarial object, increasing the strength of the at-
tack.
For a GAN to create samples approximately from the
training distribution, we need to ensure that z follows
its intended distribution z ∼ Q. This is the distribution
which was used during training of the generator. For z
outside of Q, the generated images look unnatural. For
many available GAN networks, Q is a standard normal
distribution z ∼ N (0, I). Although we restrict ourselves
to normal distributions in this work, it is important to
note that the same procedure analogously applies to more
complex distributions of z.
We implement the regularization loss L1 based on the
difference between the intended and the estimated distri-
bution of z. In order to quantify the difference between
two distributions, we use a KL divergence:
L1 = DKL(P ||Q) (5)
where P is the estimated distribution of current z and Q
is its intended distribution.
Given the intended distribution of z ∼ N (0, I), we ini-
tialize z by sampling each element from N (0, 1). To
estimate z at each iteration, we assume that each element
is drawn from the same normal distribution. We estimate
its mean µˆP and variance σˆ2P by computing them over all
elements of z. For Q = N (0, 1):
DKL(P ||Q) = log 1
σˆP
+
σˆ2P + µˆ
2
P
2
− 1
2
(6)
Figure 1 visualizes our framework and the end-to-end
optimization. The generation of an adversarial image
starts with the input of the target image. The framework
internally initializes a latent object vector z by a random
draw fromN (0, I) and overlays the picture generated by
the GAN on the input image. The object detector scores
each candidate bounding box we need for our loss func-
tion. The latent object representation z is then updated
using a suitable gradient descent method with the overall
end-to-end gradient.
Our proposed framework uses only the generator net-
work of the GAN. We therefore just expect a (differ-
entiable) function GAN(z) creating images form latent
representations z. Such functions can potentially also be
learned by other frameworks, e.g. (Variational) Auto En-
coder [Kingma and Welling, 2013]. The only reason to
use a GAN in our work is the typically more convincing
perceptual quality of generated images.
3.4 EXPECTATION OVER TRANSFORMATION
To improve the robustness of the adversarial objects,
we implemented the Expectation over Transformation
method [Athalye et al., 2017] using translation, bright-
ness, size and smoothing transforms T . We optimize
the expectation value of Equation 3 under application
of such transforms to the generated object before patch-
ing them onto the background image. Integrating over
transforms increased the success rate of adversarial ob-
ject generation.
3.5 IMPLEMENTATION
Algorithm 1: Generating Unrestricted False Positive
Adversarial Objects
input : Background Image x′, Target Detection Class
c, Generative Adversarial Network GAN,
Object Detector D, Learning Rate λ
output: vector z
z ←− random(N (0, I));
counter ←− 0;
while counter < 5 do
t←− random(T );
z ←− adamUpdate(z,∇zL(z, c, t), λ);
if D(x′ ⊕ GAN(z), c) ≥ 0.95 then
counter ++;
else
counter ←− 0;
end
end
We implement the method in TensorFlow 1.12
[Tensorflow, 2020]. We import two frozen graphs
into our framework. One corresponding to the target
object detector and the other one corresponding to the
GAN network. We have a complete view of these
two graphs, and we are able to augment them such
that we can skip nodes which loose gradient such as
rounding. We optimize using TensorFlow’s Adam
implementation. In each iteration we apply a random
transform to the generated image before stitching onto
the background image. Because detection model is DNN
we approximate L0 (Equation 4) with second to last
layer values, before sigmoid function is applied. Loss
function optimization is noisy. Therefore, optimization
is terminated with success if the detection confidence
for our target class surpasses 0.9 five iterations in a row
within at most 2,000 iterations, otherwise the case fails.
Algorithm 1 shows the generation process.
Table 1: Performance and execution time of object de-
tectors [Arcos-Garcia et al., 2018] used in evaluation.
Object Detector mAP Inference [ms]
ResNet-101 95.08 123
Inception v2 90.62 59
SSD Mobilenet 61.64 15
4 EVALUATION
4.1 SETUP
We illustrate our new attack on traffic sign object de-
tection networks. The correct functionality of these de-
tectors is important for autonomous driving applications.
We attack three different pre-trained models: two Faster
R-CNNs object detectors (using ResNet-101 and Incep-
tion v2 as CNN layer) and SSD Mobilenet v1. These
models recognize three categories of traffic signs: pro-
hibitory, mandatory and danger. These networks were
evaluated in the study on deep neural networks for traf-
fic signs in [Arcos-Garcia et al., 2018]. We chose these
networks to cover various possible use cases: the Faster
R-CNN networks have a high mean average precision
(mAP), while the SSD Mobilenet has a fast inference
time. Table 1 summarizes the object detectors used in
our experiments, and their performance, as reported in
[Arcos-Garcia et al., 2018]. In the rest of the evaluation
section, we use the terms ResNet-101, Inception v2 and
SSD Mobilenet to denote these three object detectors.
In our experiments, we use the logo generator iWGAN-
LC [Sage et al., 2018] to synthesize the adversarial ob-
jects. For this logo GAN, the output is a square logo of
size 64 × 64 pixels. An attacker could add the realisti-
cally looking logos in places visible to the camera used
for the traffic sign detection (other cars in traffic, bill-
boards). Figure 3 shows sample adversarial logos gener-
ated by the logo GAN for each category of traffic signs,
together with real traffic signs from each category of the
object detectors.
To propagate the gradient through the Faster R-
CNN neural networks, we used the algorithm pre-
sented in [Chen et al., 2018], which overcomes the non-
differentiability of the two-stage process of these net-
works.
Since SSD Mobilenet is a one phase detector, we adapt
the generation process. As a first step, SSD Mobilenet
resizes original image of size 1200 × 720 to 300 × 300.
The logo is resized 4× on x-axis and 2.4× on y-axis.
(a) Non-Adversarial Logos
(b) Naive Adversarial Logos
(c) Adversarial Logos with Normality Test
Figure 2: Comparison between non-adversarial, naive
adversarial, and adversarial logos generated by adding
the normality test to the loss function.
The resizing operation is differentiable, therefore the gra-
dient can be propagated through. Downsizing means
that the gradient is distributed among multiple pixels of
the original logo. The generation process stagnates and
does not produce adversarial objects. To address this
challenge, we exploit the detection process of SSD Mo-
bilenet, which detects bounding boxes of various scales.
We resize the background image to 300×300 and overlap
the object over the resized image. While the adversarial
object is optimized on large bounding boxes of SSD, it is
also effective on small bounding boxes.
4.2 NORMALITY TEST IN LOSS FUNCTION
To illustrate the importance of the normality test in the
loss function, we generate three types of logos. First,
we generate benign logos by randomly sampling a la-
tent vector from normal distribution N (0, I). Second,
we generate adversarial image by minimizing detection
loss only thereby ignoring the distribution loss by setting
κ = 0 in (Equation 3) (naive adversarial logos). The
quality of naive adversarial logos is visibly lower. The
propagated gradient can change the input latent vector
such that the likelihood of a vector being sampled from
normal distribution is low. The probability that these la-
tent variables are encountered during training process of
the GAN is negligible. Therefore, the generator outputs
a logo which looks artificial. The third group of logos
are adversarial logos that were generated by using the
normality test in the loss function (Equation 5).
Figure 2 shows all the three types of logos. We ob-
serve that the logos with a high variance look unnatural,
whereas the non-adversarial and adversarial logos have
a better quality. Importantly, we observe that the adver-
Prohibitory Signs Mandatory Signs Danger Signs
Traffic Signs
ResNet-101
Inception v2
SSD Mobilenet
Figure 3: Adversarial objects for three classes of traffic signs attacking three different object detection networks
sarial logos have a similar natural look compared to the
non-adversarial logos.
4.3 IMPROVING ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS
To improve the robustness of the adversarial objects, we
add random transformations to the input during the gen-
eration process, described in [Athalye et al., 2017]. Ad-
ditionally, these transformations speed up the generation
process, due to a broader exploration of the latent space.
We implement four types of transformations: 1) Trans-
lation: the adversarial object is shifted to different po-
sition onto the input image; 2) Brightness: the overall
brightness of image with adversarial object is changed;
3) Size: the adversarial object is resized; 4) Smoothing:
a smoothing Bayesian filter is applied to the image with
adversarial object.
At each iteration, we add small random perturbations to
these parameters. We build three experiments, to sim-
ulate various physical world conditions. We see that the
robustness of the adversarial logos with transformation is
better, but the difference is small. However, the success
rate of generating an adversarial logo in 2000 iterations
increased by 10%. Our hypothesis is that the logo GAN
creates a robust image with large areas of the same color.
Moreover, these areas are clearly separated. The robust-
ness gains are small, but the success rate of generating
adversarial logos is improved by the transformations.
When using the transformations, individual success rates
of ResNet-101, Inception v2, and SSD Mobilenet are
67%, 76% and 5% respectively. Even though the success
rate for SSD Mobilenet is low, attacker is not constrained
by time to perform the attack.
Table 2: Transferability of adversarial objects between
different object detectors. The rows correspond to the
originally attacked model. The columns show transfer-
ability to the target models.
Resnet-101 Inception v2 SSD
Resnet-101 – 64.36% 16.83%
Inception v2 50.88% – 28.07%
SSD 21.43% 39.29% –
4.4 TRANSFERABLE ADVERSARIAL
OBJECTS
Given the three object detectors, we evaluate the trans-
ferability of the adversarial objects. Even if an attacker
does not have access to the object detector architecture, it
is possible to perform black-box attacks by training dif-
ferent DNN and generating adversarial object on it.
Table 2 shows our transferability experiment results. The
two Faster R-CNNs have a high transferability, whereas
the attacks are less transferable to the SSD Mobilenet.
Given that the Faster R-CNNs share a significant por-
tion of the DNN architecture, these results are expected.
Overall, Table 2 shows that the adversarial objects gener-
ated with our algorithm are transferable between object
detectors, even if they are based on completely different
architectures.
4.5 PHYSICAL WORLD EXPERIMENT
For the physical test, we generate 9 adversarial logos for
all pairs of attacked classes (prohibitory, mandatory, dan-
Figure 4: Photo taken from position 4 with adversarial
objects identified as traffic signs by the object detectors.
123
456
Adversarial Object
5m
4m
Figure 5: Bird’s-eye view of the six positions of the cam-
era for the physical world experiment.
ger) and detection networks (Faster R-CNN ResNet-101,
Faster R-CNN Inception v2, SSD Mobilnet v1). After
the generation, the logos are printed using a standard of-
fice printer on a regular paper, resized to 20 cm×20 cm.
For each logo, we take six photos from different dis-
tances and angles. Figure 5 shows the six positions we
have used. Photos are taken using a iPhone X camera
with telephoto f/2.4 aperture. Figure 4 shows an exam-
ple photo taken from position 4.
Finally, the photos are down-sampled to 1200× 720 pix-
els, and fed into the three detection networks. Table 3
shows the confidence of each network in detecting given
class for each adversarial logo. Positions 3 and 6 give the
lowest confidence values on average, due to the angle and
distance from the logo. We observe the transferability
of adversarial objects in physical world between the two
Faster R-CNNs as well. SSD Mobilet under-performs
due to its low detection performance. Additionally, we
test two non-adversarial logos in the physical world and
they are not detected from any of the six positions.
(a) Non-adversarial Objects
(b) Adversarial Objects
Figure 6: Comparison between non-adversarial and ad-
versarial objects generated by the SNGAN trained on the
CIFAR-10 dataset.
4.6 CIFAR-10 SNGAN
To further evaluate our attack, we train a SNGAN
[Miyato et al., 2018] using the CIFAR-10 dataset. We
have used the implementation described in [Yang, 2018].
Figure 6 shows samples of adversarial objects generated
by this GAN, compared to non-adversarial objects. We
observe that the non-adversarial examples have a similar
quality with the adversarial objects. This strengthens our
confidence that our attack method generates adversarial
objects that look as natural as the normal images synthe-
sized by the generative model.
5 RELATED WORK
[Song et al., 2018] employs GAN networks to create ex-
amples which a human observer classifies differently
than a classifier. The main difference from our work is
the attack setting. In their work, the GAN creates images
from the same domain as the target classifier. We can
use off-the-shelf pre-trained GANs that synthesize im-
ages from domains unrelated to the detected classes of
the object detectors (e.g., if the object detector identifies
animals, our approach can use a GAN that creates cars as
adversarial objects). Our attack can be easier to perform
in the physical world and more covert.
[Wang et al., 2019, Xiao et al., 2018] use GANs to di-
rectly create adversarial examples without an it-
erative method. [Wang et al., 2019] creates unre-
stricted examples, whereas [Xiao et al., 2018] uses
GANs to create perturbation-based adversarial examples.
[Zhao et al., 2017] uses a GAN and an inverter to find the
latent variables. Their attack works by finding a good re-
gion of the latent space which creates adversarial exam-
ples through a random search algorithm, unlike our ap-
proach based on gradient descent. Their work focuses on
black-box attacks. [Wang et al., 2019, Xiao et al., 2018,
Zhao et al., 2017] need a specially-constructed GAN,
whereas our method can work with pre-trained GANs.
Table 3: Detection confidence of object detection DNNs in physical world experiment for 9 adversarial objects.
ResNet-101
Inception v2
SSD
Category Prohibitory Mandatory Danger
Target DNN ResNet Inception SSD ResNet Inception SSD ResNet Inception SSD
Pos. 1
99%
98%
–
98%
99%
99%
–
54%
32%
99%
99%
–
99%
99%
–
–
–
96%
99%
98%
–
–
94%
–
–
–
–
Pos. 2
99%
99%
–
98%
99%
67%
60%
39%
–
99%
99%
–
99%
99%
–
–
76%
–
99%
99%
–
99%
99%
43%
–
41%
44%
Pos. 3
91%
92%
–
95%
98%
–
–
36%
–
99%
76%
–
–
99%
–
–
93%
–
–
20%
–
99%
99%
10%
–
–
24%
Pos. 4
99%
99%
–
99%
99%
99%
91%
35%
97%
99%
99%
–
99%
99%
–
99%
97%
89%
99%
80%
–
99%
99%
69%
–
95%
–
Pos. 5
97%
99%
–
99%
99%
91%
54%
45%
–
99%
99%
–
99%
99%
–
99%
98%
99%
99%
89%
–
99%
99%
79%
–
57%
99%
Pos. 6
84%
99%
–
99%
99%
–
89%
96%
–
99%
–
–
31%
90%
–
99%
99%
–
–
11%
–
99%
99%
–
–
–
–
All of the previously mentioned papers explore attacks
against classifiers. In our work we explore attacks
against object detectors. Additionally, none of them ex-
plores attacks in physical world. We believe that real-
world perturbations represent a high, as these attacks do
not require the access to the camera.
In recent work, [Kurakin et al., 2016, Sharif et al., 2016,
Eykholt et al., 2018b, Eykholt et al., 2018a,
Chen et al., 2018] explored adversarial examples in
physical world. They work by creating adversarial
stickers/patches which are put onto other objects,
e.g., stop signs. After the camera takes a picture, the
augmented stop sign is misclassified/undetected. More-
over, [Eykholt et al., 2018a] looked at creating false
positive attacks using current techniques for creating
perturbation-based adversarial examples. The detection
model recognized the adversarial object as a stop sign,
even thought to a human observer it does not look like
one. The potential limitation of these approaches is the
high salience of such objects. We believe that if the
attacker launches a physical attack, it is easy to identify
the malicious object and indict the attacker. In our work,
the GAN network produces robust adversarial objects
which are assimilated in the real world scenery.
The detectors used in [Eykholt et al., 2018a,
Chen et al., 2018, Sitawarin et al., 2018] are not ac-
cessible. The missing performance statistics make it
hard to judge the attack’s strength. In our work, the
detectors are chosen from a published work in traffic
sign detection [Arcos-Garcia et al., 2018].
6 CONCLUSION
We defined a new attack for object detectors, based on
unrestricted adversarial examples. To synthesize adver-
sarial objects, we use off-the-shelf pre-trained GANs
that generate images unrelated to the detected classes
of the target neural network. Importantly, the syn-
thesized adversarial objects are indistinguishable from
non-adversarial outputs of the GANs, from a human’s
perspective. We experimented with the Faster R-CNN
ResNet-101, Inception v2 and SSD Mobilenet object
detectors trained for traffic sign recognition and used
two pre-trained generative models, SNGAN trained on
CIFAR-10 and logo generating iWGAN-LC. The evalua-
tion results show that the adversarial objects are transfer-
able between target neural networks (between 16% and
64%). Moreover, we validated the adversarial objects in
a physical world setup, which demonstrated their robust-
ness to camera angle and distance to the camera. By in-
troducing unrestricted false positive adversarial objects,
we extend the space of attacks and open new directions
to investigate the reliability of object detectors.
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